This paper formulates and estimates a dynamic discrete choice model of elder parent care and work to analyze how caregiving affects a woman's current and future labor force participation and wages. Intertemporal tradeoffs, such as decreased future earning capacity due to a current reduction in labor market work, are central to the decision to provide care. The existing literature, however, overlooks such long-term considerations. I depart from the previous literature by modeling caregiving and work decisions in an explicitly intertemporal framework. The model incorporates dynamic elements such as the health of the elderly parent, human capital accumulation and job offer availability. I estimate the model on a sample of women from the Health and Retirement Study by efficient method of moments. The estimates indicate that intertemporal tradeoffs matter considerably. In particular, women face low probabilities of returning to work or increasing work hours after a caregiving spell. Using the estimates, I simulate several government sponsored elder care policy experiments: a longer unpaid leave than currently available under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993; a paid work leave; and a caregiver allowance. The leaves encourage more work among intensive care providers since they guarantee a woman can return to her job, while the caregiver allowance discourages work. A comparison of the welfare gains generated by the policies shows that half the value of the paid leave can be achieved with the unpaid leave, and the caregiver allowance generates gains comparable to the unpaid leave.
Introduction
How does caregiving for an elderly parent affect a woman's current and future labor force participation and wages? Working less to provide care clearly affects a woman's current income, but it is also clear that her future labor market opportunities can be affected. Women who spend time away from work to provide care may later struggle to find a job or return to their previous wage. In addition, caregiving often involves a significant time commitment. On average, caregivers provide 10 to 20 hours of care per week for four years (MetLife 2009a, National Alliance for Caregiving and AARP 2009). Thus, the decision to provide care may mean a substantial loss of current and future earning capacity. These considerations make clear the potential long-term labor market effects of caregiving and underscore the inherent forward-looking nature of caregiving and work decisions.
Understanding the short and long-term effects of caregiving on work and wages is an important policy issue given the large and growing population of disabled elderly and the prevalence of informal care provided by adult daughters, most of whom have a history of working. Currently in the United States there are 9 million men and women over the age of 65 who need help with basic personal activities, household chores or errands. By 2020, 12 million older Americans are projected to need long-term care. 1 About 70 percent of the elderly rely solely on informal care from family or friends, and about two-thirds of elder parent caregivers are women, a group which has experienced increasing labor force participation rates. In light of these trends and the fact that a typical caregiver is in her fifties or early sixties, still in her prime working years, providing care may involve a considerable loss of current and future human capital and job opportunities.
Despite the intertemporal nature of caregiving and work, the existing literature has overlooked the dynamics of these decisions. Most models are static and focus only on current foregone wages, which could seriously underestimate the costs of caregiving. In contrast to most earlier studies, I model caregiving and work decisions in an explicitly intertemporal framework in which women make these decisions considering how they will affect future outcomes. I build and estimate a dynamic discrete choice model of caregiving and work that incorporates dynamic elements such as health changes of elderly parents, human capital accumulation and labor market frictions. These features allow for long-term labor market effects of informal care that may arise due to foregone or lower wages and/or decreased job opportunities during and after a caregiving spell. By incorporating these elements in a dynamic framework, I can identify various channels through which caregiving affects a woman's labor market outcomes over the short and long-term.
I estimate the structural parameters of the model using eight waves of data from the Health and Retirement Study by efficient method of moments. The results highlight various static and dynamic labor market tradeoffs faced by caregivers. Women who begin care provision are likely to continue to do so, especially if their parent is in poor health. Thus, when a woman makes caregiving and work decisions, she not only considers the tradeoff between caregiving and work today, but also the potential long-term tradeoffs generated by the persistence in caregiving. In addition, women are more likely to provide large amounts of care when their parents are in poor health, and these intensive care providers are less likely to be working, especially full-time.
The estimates also underscore the importance of labor market frictions. Women who do not work face low probabilities of receiving job offers in the future. For example, the probability a non-working woman younger than 62 will receive a part-time (full-time) offer next period is 7-9 (9-12) percent. Thus, those who leave work to provide care may find it difficult to return. The estimates also reveal that women cannot move frictionlessly between full and part-time work. As a result, a woman may not always have the option to decrease her work hours while providing care.
If she does work part-time while caregiving, she is not guaranteed to be able to move to full-time work in the future. The wage estimates show that there are returns to experience, there is a wage penalty for not working in the prior period and that part-time jobs are associated with lower wages.
Thus, women who leave work to provide care forgo experience and the associated wage returns, and face a lower expected wage if they return to work. In addition, caregivers are more likely to work part-time than non-caregivers, and earn a lower wage than had they worked full-time.
I use the parameter estimates and model to calculate the value (equivalently, the cost) of elder parent care, which reflects both the static and dynamic value of caregiving. The median value of initiating care provision is $66,370 over a two-year period, about half the cost of two years of nursing home care. This estimate is two to three times larger than the values found in the previous literature, which are calculated using the replacement wage approach or current foregone wages due to caregiving. Thus, calculations that ignore forward-looking behavior and the intertemporal nature of caregiving and work decisions underestimate the value of elder parent care. The estimated structural parameters are then used to analyze how various government sponsored programs for elder parent care affect a woman's caregiving and labor market decisions. I analyze three counterfactual policy experiments: (1) A two-year unpaid work leave to provide intensive care for a parent; (2) A two-year paid work leave to provide intensive care where the caregiver receives a payment that is tied to the health of the parent; (3) A caregiver allowance where those who provide intensive care receive a payment that is tied to the health of their parent, is not linked to their employment status and can be received indefinitely. The first policy experiment is a lengthier version of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993 which allows workers to take up to a 12-week unpaid leave to care for an ill family member and guarantees the worker will return to his/her job at the same wage. The second policy experiment is of particular interest as paid leaves have recently received much attention both at the national and state-level. caregiver allowance experiment may inform about the labor market effects of policies similar to that of the recently suspended CLASS Act.
The results of the policy experiments show that both the unpaid and paid leaves generate modest increases in intensive care provision, and encourage more work, especially full-time, among women who ever provide intensive care to a parent. On the other hand, the caregiver allowance generates substantial increases in intensive care provision, but leads to an increase in non-work among women who ever provide intensive care. A comparison of the welfare gains generated by the policies shows that about half the value of the paid leave can be achieved with the unpaid leave, and the caregiver allowance and the unpaid leave generate comparable welfare gains. The gains generated by the leaves emphasize the value of guaranteeing a caregiver can return to work, and underscore the importance of taking an intertemporal approach to modeling caregiving and work.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature. The structural model is presented in Section 3. Identification is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 describes the data, discusses empirical implementation and provides descriptive statistics. Estimation is discussed in Section 6. Section 7 presents the main results, model fit and the value of elder parent care calculation. Section 8 discusses the counterfactual policy experiments and results, and Section 9 concludes.
Related Literature
This paper contributes to two strands of the literature. The first examines the relationship between elder parent care and labor market outcomes such as labor force participation, work hours and wages. Most US and European studies find there is a negative correlation between female labor force participation and caregiving (Ettner 1995 , Pavalko and Artis 1997 , Heitmueller 2007 , Bolin et al. 2008 , Crespo and Mira 2010 , Van Houtven, Coe, and Skira 2010 . 3 However, the magnitude of this negative correlation varies across studies, ranging from an almost negligible effect to a 30 percentage point decrease in the the probability of working. In addition, this negative correlation is stronger among intensive caregivers, or those with a greater commitment of caregiving time (Ettner 1995 , Carmichael and Charles 1998 , Heitmueller 2007 , Casado-Marín et al. 2011 ).
There is less consensus concerning whether caregivers who remain in the labor force reduce their work hours. Wolf and Soldo (1994) , Bolin et al. (2008) and Casado-Marín et al. (2011) find little evidence of caregiving reducing work hours, while Ettner (1996) , Johnson and LoSasso (2000) and Van Houtven, Coe, and Skira (2010) find female caregivers in the US do reduce their work hours.
In terms of wage effects, Carmichael and Charles (2003) find caregiving for more than 10 hours per week reduces current wages by 9 percent for women in the UK, and Heitmueller and Inglis (2007) find caregivers in the UK earn 3 percent less than non-caregivers with similar characteristics. Van Houtven, Coe, and Skira (2010) find caregiving leads to a 2.3 to 2.6 percent reduction in a woman's hourly wage in the US. While this literature examines several tradeoffs between caregiving and female labor supply, the tradeoffs are analyzed in isolation. In addition, these studies only evaluate the effect of caregiving today on a woman's current labor market outcomes. 4 This is the first paper to examine the effects of caregiving on current and future labor force participation, at the intensive and extensive margins, as well as wages in one comprehensive framework. This paper also contributes to the literature that formulates theoretical models of caregiving and work. Almost all of the models are static time allocation models where the adult child makes caregiving and work decisions at a single point in time and the only cost of caregiving is current foregone wages (for example, Börsch-Supan et al. 1992 , Johnson and LoSasso 2000 , Crespo and Mira 2010 , Knoef and Kooreman 2011 . There is no forward-looking behavior, no parental health dynamics and no long-term costs of caregiving. Fevang et al. (2009) is the only study which provides a theoretical model of caregiving and work with multiple periods. In that model, however, perfect foresight is assumed-with certainty a parent is healthy in the first period, sick and in need of care in the second period, and passes away in the third period. The adult child can freely adjust her work hours over these three periods and the wage is assumed to be constant over all periods.
I expand upon the literature by modeling caregiving and work decisions in an intertemporal framework which includes a forward-looking adult daughter, parental health changes and uncertainty, human capital accumulation and labor market frictions. The model allows informal care to have long-term labor market effects through several channels, such as foregone or lower wages over time and decreased job offers. With the recent exception of Knoef and Kooreman (2011) , the structural parameters of the theoretical models are not estimated in the above-mentioned studies. 5 By estimating the structural parameters of the model, I can simulate counterfactual policy experiments such as the work leave and caregiver allowance programs described above. No studies have attempted to analyze the impact of government sponsored elder parent care programs on the caregiving and labor supply decisions of adult children in the US or the welfare gains generated by such policies.
Model
To answer the questions posed above, I propose a one-child one-parent structural dynamic discrete choice model in which an adult daughter makes joint decisions about caregiving and work. 6 The 4 Heitmueller et al. (2010) and Moscarola (2010) allow last year's caregiving decision to affect current labor force participation but do not allow for direct contemporaneous effects of caregiving on employment. Spiess and Schneider (2003) find recently terminating care provision is insignificantly related to changes in work hours in Europe.
5 Knoef and Kooreman (2011) estimate the structural parameters of their static model using only children, and then use those estimates to assess the nature of interactions between siblings. Börsch-Supan et al. (1992) jointly model employment and "time spent with parents," which is a much broader concept than time spent providing care. They estimate equations based on the underlying structural model.
6 I abstract from the other parent since less than 7 percent of female caregivers care for both parents simultaneously. If both parents are alive, spousal caregiving is the most prevalent form of informal care (Spillman and Pezzin 2000) . optimization problem, consistent with the data available for estimation, begins at a point in the middle of the daughter's lifecycle. 7 At any period t, the daughter has up to two choices to make.
She makes an employment decision E = {0, P T, F T } for non-employment, part-time work and full-time work, respectively, and a caregiving decision (given a parent is alive) CG = {0, 1, 2} for no caregiving, light caregiving and intensive caregiving, respectively.
Preferences
The woman is forward-looking and at any time t, her objective is to maximize her expected lifetime utility, U t , given the choice set she faces. A woman's period utility, u t , is determined by her consumption, C t , leisure time, L t , and caregiving decision, CG t . The daughter receives direct utility from light and intensive caregiving which varies with the health state of her parent, H p t . 8 This captures the idea that when a parent is very sick, a child may derive relatively more utility from caregiving than when the parent is healthy. In addition, there is a utility cost to initiating care which varies with the health of the parent. This captures the idea that beginning care provision may involve substantial adjustments (in the daughter's schedule, for example) and may be more difficult when the parent is already in poor health. Utility from caregiving also varies with whether the woman has a sister, sis t , since she may derive relatively less utility from caregiving when there are other adult daughters who could potentially provide care. 9,10 I allow for permanent unobserved heterogeneity in preferences through differences in the utility from leisure. 11 The period utility function is assumed to be linear in its arguments with some interaction terms and is given by
where denotes the woman's unobserved type and ν t,E,CG denotes time-varying unobserved utility from each choice in the model. The unobserved utility arguments, ν t,E,CG , are assumed to be additively separable, serially uncorrelated and normally distributed with mean zero and covariance I abstract from other adult children since among families with at least one informal care provider and at least two adult children, only 14 percent include multiple caregiving adult children (Byrne et al. 2009 ). Modeling a dynamic sibling bargaining game is currently beyond the scope of this paper but is a promising avenue for future research. 7 Initial conditions are those that prevail at that lifecycle point, and are addressed in Section 5.3. 8 The parental health states and the health transition process are discussed in detail in Section 3.5. 9 I abstract from allowing utility from caregiving to vary with whether the woman has a brother since Engers and Stern (2002) , Checkovich and Stern (2002) , Byrne et al. (2009) and several others find that all else equal, daughters are significantly more likely than sons to provide care.
10 I assume the utility from informal care provision does not vary with the parent's financial needs. McGarry (1998) finds no significant difference between more and less wealthy parents in the conditional probability of receiving informal care from children. Brown (2007) finds no evidence that children provide care in response to their parents' financial need, but rather to their parents' care needs in a dynamic structural model of parents' retirement asset choices and family care arrangements.
11 I allow for two types, ∈ {1, 2}, who differ in permanent features unobserved to the econometrician. In addition to having different leisure preferences, the types have different wage offer intercepts as discussed in Section 3.4. matrix Σ ν to be estimated. 12 The assumed utility function specification is provided in Appendix A.
Time and Budget Constraints
The daughter's leisure, L t , is constrained to equal the time that remains in a period given her work and caregiving choices. Caregiving is a use of time that is valued differently than leisure since a woman gets direct utility from caregiving, but the time constraint makes it clear that the direct opportunity cost of caregiving is foregone leisure time. The time constraint is given by
where T is the total time available per decision period, h E t denotes the hours associated with the woman's employment choice and h CG t denotes the hours associated with her caregiving choice.
The daughter's consumption, C t , is constrained by the sum of her hourly wage, w t , times hours worked, h E t , and non-labor income, y t . 13 Non-labor income varies with the woman's education, age and marital status, and is included because the woman may receive income from other sources such as her spouse or retirement benefits. 14 Thus, non-labor income captures the influences of spousal labor supply. Appendix B describes how non-labor income is formulated. The budget constraint is 12 More precisely, two covariance matrices are estimated. A 9×9 covariance matrix governs the unobserved utility from each joint caregiving and work choice for those with a parent alive. A 3×3 covariance matrix governs the unobserved utility from each work choice for women without a parent alive (since they no longer make a caregiving choice).
13 I abstract from including savings behavior directly in the model. This may be a concern if those with more savings substitute away from informal care provision and purchase care for their parents. However, in the data, there is no descriptive evidence of a lower probability of informal care provision for those with more liquid wealth or savings. In addition, Byrne et al. (2009) find among families where elderly parents receive formal health care, only 9 percent of these parents receive financial contributions for this care from their children. There may also be a concern that those with more wealth can afford to caregive by consuming their savings; however, there is no evidence that light nor intensive caregivers experience significantly different changes in assets or savings than non-caregivers. This descriptive evidence cannot be interpreted causally, and savings would need to be included directly in the structural model to test its behavioral impact. Savings is currently incorporated in the model in that the woman's initial liquid assets enter the unobserved type probabilities, which is discussed in more detail in Section 5.3. This allows for persistent differences in behavior based on wealth that operate through the permanent unobserved heterogeneity, but not intertemporal adjustments in consumption and savings behavior.
14 I abstract from inheritances and inter-vivos transfers between the parent and daughter; thus, caregiving decisions are not motivated by such financial considerations in the model. Most recent studies do not support the bequest motive. For example, Brown (2007) finds no evidence that children's caregiving behavior is influenced by parents' planned bequests; Norton and Van Houtven (2006) find informal care has no effect on the equality of intended bequests; and, Checkovich and Stern (2002) conclude that children do not compete for bequests through their provision of informal care. The evidence on inter-vivos transfers is mixed. McGarry and Schoeni (1997) and Brown (2006) find parents do not transfer significantly more to their caregiving children than their non-caregiving children on average. Norton and Van Houtven (2006) , however, find a child who provides care is 11 to 16 percentage points more likely to receive an inter-vivos transfer than a sibling who does not provide care. If such financial considerations motivate caregiving decisions for some women, this will be reflected in the utility from caregiving parameters.
given by
Job Dynamics
If a woman worked part-time in period t−1, she is assumed to receive a part-time offer with certainty in period t, and if she worked full-time in period t−1, she is assumed to receive a full-time offer with certainty in period t. 15 If the woman was not working part-time in period t − 1, either because she was not working or was working full-time, she receives a part-time offer in period t with probability 
Parental Health Transitions
Parental health is a crucial element in the model as it provides an important channel for dynamics and helps to generate persistence in caregiving. The parent's health is assumed to be unaffected by informal care provided by the daughter. 18 Thus, a woman does not provide care to change the healthy trajectory of her parent, but because she derives direct utility from caregiving which varies with the parent's health state (i.e. caregiving is a consumption good). The health of the parent takes on four discrete states: (1) Healthy; (2) Has any activities of daily living (ADL) limitations or has a memory or cognition problem; (3) Cannot be left alone for an hour or more; and (4) Death. 19 Parental health is modeled as a Markov process, which helps capture the fact that a parent's need for care may be sporadic, sustained or intensified over the course of a caregiving episode. π jk denotes the probability that the parent enters health status k where k ∈ {healthy, ADL, alone, death} in period t + 1, conditional on having been in health state j where j ∈ {healthy, ADL, alone} in period t. The transition probabilities vary with the parent's age and education. Let X p t be a vector of these parental characteristics. I then define the index variables v(k|j) as follows:
for k = ADL, alone, death
The Markov transition probabilities for the health status of the elderly parent in t + 1 are then defined by
In the data, informal care provision is positively correlated with poor parental health. Health transition estimates with informal care as an input imply that caregiving has no significant effect on parental health or leads to worsening parental health. Byrne et al. (2009) estimate elderly health-quality production functions and find informal care provided by children is relatively ineffective. Thus, I abstract from allowing informal care to affect parental health.
19 Activities of daily living include bathing, dressing and eating. The choice of health states is motivated by the parental health information available in the HRS data.
The parameters of the health transition probabilities are estimated with a multinomial logit speci- 
Dynamic Programming Problem
A woman's objective in any period t is to maximize her expected lifetime utility given by
where d t is the woman's decision at time t, D t is her decision set at time t which varies depending on whether her parent is alive and her available job offers, u dt is the period utility from her decision at time t, T is the terminal period of the model, 21 β is the discount factor and S t is a vector of the 
The lifetime utility maximization problem given in equation 7 can be rewritten in terms of value functions. The maximum expected value of discounted lifetime utility at time t can be represented by the period t value function
where V dt (S t ), the choice-specific expected lifetime value function, obeys the Bellman equation
In the data there is recovery to better health states, so I do not restrict the transition matrix to be diagonal. See Appendix C for a detailed discussion of the health transition estimation and the average predicted transition matrix.
21 The terminal period occurs at age 70. At that time I do not allow the woman to work, but she may make a final caregiving decision.
Thus, the value of any decision at time t is a function of the period utility from that choice plus the discounted expected value of future behavior given the woman's choice at time t. The expectation is taken over the distribution of future unobserved utility from each choice and future wage unobservables as well as the parental health transition probabilities and job offer probabilities. 22
Solution Method
The dynamic programming problem is solved by backward recursion given a set of model parameters. In the last period, expected values of the optimal choice are calculated for each reachable state space S T and each potential choice set via Monte Carlo simulation. For example, for a set of terminal period state variables S T , n draws of the wage unobservable and unobserved utility arguments are drawn and the maximum of the choice-specific value functions is calculated and recorded for each draw. 23 The average of the maximum value functions over the n draws is the expected maximum value of arriving at time T with that choice set available and state space S T .
Moving back one period, that expected value is used to do the same calculation for period T − 1, and this procedure is repeated until the first period is reached. This process is described in greater detail in Keane and Wolpin (1994) .
Model Summary
The model allows for current and long-term labor market effects of caregiving in several ways. First, job offer probabilities depend on the woman's prior work decision. Thus, if a woman leaves work or decreases her work hours at some point during a caregiving episode, she may face a reduced probability of receiving job offers in future periods, and hence find it difficult to return to work or increase her work hours. Second, wage offers depend on a woman's years of work experience, whether she worked last period and whether the offer is associated with a part-time job. Thus, women who leave work while caregiving forgo returns to experience and may face lower future wage offers due to human capital depreciation. In addition, if women make adjustments on the intensive margin while caregiving and transition to part-time work, they may face a lower wage offer. Third, the health transitions are modeled in such a way that the parent's health could improve, be sustained, or deteriorate. As a result, the caregiving trajectory is uncertain and the associated work adjustments (for example to non-work or part-time work) could potentially last several periods.
22 Women make decisions assuming their marital status will be the same next period, and that whether they have a sister will be the same next period since fewer than 4 percent of women in the data experience a change in marital status and fewer than 2 percent experience a change in whether they have a sister. This assumption can be relaxed in future work.
23 Currently n = 175.
Identification
Since only accepted job offers are observed, the econometrician typically cannot distinguish whether a woman's decision not to work was the result of rejecting a job offer or not receiving an offer.
Furthermore, if she receives a job offer, it is typically difficult to distinguish whether rejection occurs because she has a high preference for leisure or she received a low wage offer. A variety of assumptions allow for separate identification of the utility from leisure, the wage offer parameters and the parameters of the job offer probabilities. Exclusionary restrictions and functional form assumptions both help. For example, the job offer probabilities depend non-linearly on whether the woman has reached age 62, but the utility from leisure is the same for all women of a given type , and wage offers depend continuously on age and aged squared. Thus, if women age 62
and over are observed to work infrequently, this would be explained by low job offer probabilities, not a higher preference for leisure or lower wage offers. In addition, the job holding assumption helps to separately identify the utility from leisure from the job offer parameters. A woman who works full-time (part-time) is assumed to have a full-time (part-time) job offer with certainty in the next period, which means when a woman moves from full or part-time work to non-work, the econometrician knows a job was available and the expected wage offer. Thus, the utility from leisure can be identified by women transitioning from full or part-time work to non-work, since non-work was chosen over an offered wage. The offer probabilities are then separately identified by observed transitions from non-work to full or part-time work, from part-time to full-time work, and from full-time to part-time work.
The utility from caregiving parameters are separately identified from the utility from leisure in several ways. First, women who no longer have a parent alive only make work choices, thus their leisure time is only a function of their work choice, and their work decisions help to identify the utility from leisure. The assumed exogeneity of parental death allows the utility from leisure to be pinned down by this subgroup of women. Second, the utility from leisure is assumed to be the same for all women of a given type , while utility from caregiving varies with the health of the woman's parent. Thus, if women with parents in a certain health state are observed to caregive more than women with parents in another health state but who are otherwise similar, this would be explained by differences in the utility from caregiving over different health states, not by a lower preference for leisure. 24 In addition, utility from caregiving varies with whether the woman has a sister or not. If women without sisters are observed to caregive more frequently than women with sisters, this again would be explained by differences in the utility from caregiving, not by a lower preference for leisure.
Identification of the wage offer parameters can be viewed as a sample selection problem since only 24 It is important to keep in mind that I assume caregiving does not affect the health transition probabilities. Thus, observing differences in caregiving frequency and intensity over different parental health states is explained by differences in the utility from caregiving over these health states, not by care provision affecting health transitions.
accepted wage offers are observed in the data. The solution to the dynamic programming problem generates the sample selection rules (i.e. generates an implicit reservation wage). The functional form, distributional and exclusionary assumptions made in the model serve the same purpose as a sample selection correction in either a two-step or full information maximum likelihood procedure (Eckstein and Wolpin 1999) . The distributional assumption is the normality of the time-varying wage unobservable, t , in the log wage offer function. In addition, the model generates selection into work that is driven by observables besides those of the wage offer. First, non-labor income which enters consumption varies with whether the woman has reached age 62, her marital status and the interaction between the two, but wage offers do not. Second, women with parents alive make a caregiving choice which depends in part on their parents' realized health state and whether they have a sister, neither of which affect the wage offer. The caregiving choice is made simultaneously with the work choice and different joint choices lead to different amounts of leisure time. The caregiving choice, however, does not have a direct impact on wage offers.
Last, permanent unobserved heterogeneity enters the model in two places. Unobserved types differ in their utility from leisure and their wage offer intercept. 25 The idea is to allow women to differ in permanent ways unobserved to the econometrician and estimate the distribution of types to fit the persistence of their choices and observed wages. When two women who are equivalent in their observable characteristics persistently make different choices or have persistently different accepted wages, this implies they likely differ in unobservable characteristics. Thus, identification of the unobserved type proportions is achieved through across group variation in caregiving and work choices and wages. It is important to note that the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity introduces serially correlated state variables. For example, the sum of the permanent heterogeneity component in the wage offer, β 0, , and the i.i.d. wage unobservable, t , is a serially correlated state variable. Thus, women can select into caregiving and work on the basis of persistent differences in the utility from leisure and wage offers which are unobserved by the econometrician. It should be noted that the assumption that the wage unobservable, t , is i.i.d. is important for identification of the wage penalty for not working in the prior period (parameter β 8 ).
Data and Empirical Implementation
The data are drawn from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) which is representative of the non-institutional US population born between 1931 and 1941 and their spouses. The HRS is a panel survey which provides longitudinal information on labor supply, family structure, intergenerational transfers, health, income and assets. The baseline interviews were completed for 12,654 individuals in 7,702 households in 1992. At that time, respondents were approximately 51 to 61 years old or were married to individuals in that age range. Follow-up interviews took place biennially. The 25 I follow the usual convention in the dynamic programming literature of allowing for a small number of types. The correlation in the two dimensions (i.e. leisure preferences and wage offers) is restricted by allowing for two types.
HRS is well-suited for this study since it follows a large sample of individuals at midlife over time, many of whom have elderly parents alive. In addition, it contains information on parents of all respondents, regardless of whether the parent needs or is receiving care. Thus, I am able to examine the behavior of women who do and do not provide care.
I restrict the sample to female HRS respondents between the ages of 42 and 70. In addition, I restrict potential care recipients to be mothers and there are several reasons for this restriction.
First, only 21 percent of the women in the HRS report having a father alive in the 1992 wave of the survey, whereas about 47 percent report having a mother alive. 26 In addition, fathers are less likely to receive care than mothers Stern 1999, Byrne et al. 2009 ). In the HRS data, less than one-third of the fathers ever receive care, but over one-half of the mothers receive care at some point in the sample period. The sample is restricted to women who report having a mother alive in the 1992 wave of the survey, and I use the 1994 through 2008 data for estimation of the model. The sample size is 3,094 women with 18,066 person-wave observations.
Caregiving and Work Measures
Since the HRS interviews occur biennially, a decision period in the model corresponds to two calendar years. In implementing the model, the total time available in a decision period, T , is equal to 10,200 hours (14 hours per day times 730 days). Thus, time allocated to caregiving and work is assigned based on two-year decision periods.
The HRS asks respondents "Have you (or your husband/partner) spent 100 or more hours in the past two years helping your parent(s)/step-parents with basic personal needs like dressing, eating, and bathing?" The survey then asks who was helped and how many hours of care the respondent and, separately her spouse provided. After 1992, respondents were also asked whether they or their spouses spent a total of 100 or more hours in the past two years helping "with other things such as household chores, errands, transportation, etc." Again, the survey then asked who was helped and how many hours of care were separately provided by the respondent and her spouse. A woman is considered a caregiver if she has provided either type of care, and the hours she has spent providing both types of care are summed to determine whether she is a light or intensive caregiver. In the data, light caregivers are defined as women who provide less than 1,000 hours of care over a twoyear period, and intensive caregivers are defined as those who provide 1,000 or more hours of care over a two-year period. In the model, those who lightly caregive are assumed to caregive for 300 hours per period, while those who intensively caregive provide 2,000 hours of care per period. 27
Regarding employment status, a woman is considered to be working full-time if she works 35 or more hours per week for 36 or more weeks per year; less than this is considered part-time. In the model, those who work full-time are assumed to work 4,000 hours over the two-year period, while 26 By the 2000 survey wave, only 10 percent have a father alive, whereas 30 percent have a mother alive. 27 Among those classified as light (intensive) caregivers the median hours of care over two years is 300 (2,000) hours.
those who work part-time work 2,000 hours per period. 28 A woman is considered to be not working if she is retired, unemployed, or reports not being in the labor force. Respondents are asked to report hourly wages if they are working. If the respondent reports her pay at a different frequency, the RAND HRS data files adjust the pay rate appropriately using the respondent's reported usual hours worked per week and usual weeks worked per year.
Demographic and Parental Measures
The HRS contains detailed information on other variables that enter the estimation such as the respondent's education, years of work experience, non-labor income and family structure. In terms of family structure, in each survey wave, the woman reports her marital status, how many living siblings she has and the gender breakdown of those siblings. The woman reports various sources of non-labor income including capital income, income from pensions and annuities, income from Social Security Disability Insurance or SSI, income from Social Security retirement, spouse or widow benefits, income from unemployment or worker's compensation, income from other government transfers and her spouse's labor earnings (if she is married).
In terms of parental information, the HRS contains age and education data for each respondent's parent. The mother's education is discretized into two categories-less than a high school education versus high school graduate. In addition, the HRS reports for each respondent's parent whether he/she needs help with activities of daily living, whether he/she can be left alone for an hour or more and in waves after 1996 whether the parent has a memory or cognition problem. The HRS does not contain information about how many or which activities of daily living the parent needs help with, but only that help is required with at least one activity.
Permanent Unobserved Heterogeneity
Women enter the HRS sample at various ages during midlife. Thus, I observe decisions beginning in the middle of the lifecycle that are conditioned on state variables that arise from prior unobserved decisions. If these "initial" conditions are not exogenous (i.e. if there is unobserved heterogeneity in preferences or constraints) direct estimation will lead to bias. 29 To account for this problem, I assume the probabilities of the unobserved heterogeneity types can be represented by parametric functions of the initial state variables. If the wage unobservables and unobserved utility arguments are serially uncorrelated, the initial state variables are exogenous given type. 30 The unobserved type probabilities also depend on initial conditions that are not in the woman's state space. Specifically, the type probabilities depend on the woman's initial log wage and initial 28 In the data, the median hours worked per week by part-time (full-time) workers is 20 (40) hours. For both types of workers, the median number of weeks worked per year is 50.
29 "Initial" conditions are those that exist at the time the woman is first observed in the sample. 30 Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010) provide a detailed discussion of this initial conditions problem and possible solutions, including the one described above. discretized liquid assets. Liquid assets are composed of the net value of the woman's stocks, mutual funds and investment trusts, her checking, savings and money market accounts, and her CDs and bonds. Thus, savings enter the model through the unobserved heterogeneity, which allows women who enter the model with low or high wealth to exhibit persistent differences in caregiving and work choices. The specification of the type probability function is given in Appendix D. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for those without a mother alive and for non-caregivers, light caregivers and intensive caregivers conditional on the woman's mother being alive. 31 Light caregivers are about 2 percentage points less likely to be working than non-caregivers whereas intensive caregivers are 11 percentage points less likely to be working than non-caregivers. Both light and intensive caregivers are about 2 percentage points more likely to be working part-time than noncaregivers. While non-caregivers and light caregivers who are working appear to earn about the same hourly wage, the average accepted wage for intensive caregivers is about two dollars lower.
Descriptive Statistics
Thus, the data seems to suggest a negative relationship between caregiving and labor force participation that is particularly large for intensive caregivers. Those with a mother no longer alive are older which likely explains why almost 60 percent of this group is not working.
The data indicates that caregiving frequency and intensity vary with the health of the mother.
Non-caregivers are more likely to have healthy mothers than light caregivers and intensive caregivers. Light caregivers are about 10 percentage points more likely to have a mother who needs help with ADLs or has a memory or cognition problem than non-caregivers. About two-thirds of intensive caregivers have non-healthy mothers, and intensive caregivers are 16 percentage points more likely to have a mother who cannot be left alone compared to both non-and light caregivers. Table 2 shows the percentage of mothers in each health state that receive light or intensive care from their daughters. Less than 30 percent of healthy mothers receive informal care from their daughters and almost all care provided is light. Over half the mothers with ADL needs or a memory or cognition problem receive care, and of those receiving care, about a quarter of them are receiving intensive care from their daughter. Caregiving for a mother who cannot be left alone for an hour or more is less common than caring for a mother with ADL needs or a memory problem which may reflect the increased caregiving burden when a parent cannot be left alone. 32 However, over half the women providing care to a mother who cannot be left alone are providing intensive 31 All dollar amounts are adjusted by the Consumer Price Index using 2008 as the base year. 32 This may also reflect the mother receiving formal care either from a home aide or a nursing home. The HRS does not contain data on formal home health care utilization by parents, but does contain information about whether the mother resides in a nursing home at the time of the survey. Formal home health care utilization is somewhat rare-approximately 13 to 14 percent of the non-institutionalized elderly rely on formal (or paid) home health care (Johnson 2007 , Kaye et al. 2010 ), but generally in combination with informal care. In 2002, only 4 percent of the disabled elderly relied solely on paid help (Johnson 2007) . Nursing home usage is also rare, with only 8 percent of the mothers in the estimation sample residing in a nursing home. The model has been estimated including nursing home utilization, and the results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those from the model presented.
care. By allowing the direct utility from caregiving and the utility cost from initiating care to vary with the parent's health state, the model should be capable of matching these statistics.
Table 1 also indicates that non-caregivers are more likely to have a sister than light and intensive caregivers, and light caregivers are more likely to have a sister than intensive caregivers. By allowing the utility from caregiving to vary with whether the woman has a sister, the model should be able to match these statistics. Caregivers are slightly better educated than non-caregivers and have more years of work experience than non-caregivers, but are also slightly older on average.
Estimation
I pursue a non-likelihood-based estimation strategy, efficient method of moments (EMM), which is a type of indirect inference (see Gourieroux et al. 1993, Gallant and Tauchen 1996) . The basic idea is to fit simulated data obtained from the structural model to an auxiliary statistical model. This auxiliary statistical model can be easily estimated and must provide a complete enough statistical description of the data to be able to identify the structural parameters. Following Tartari (2006) 
where Λ is a weighting matrix and 
Auxiliary Statistical Models
The solution of the optimization problem described is a set of decision rules in which the optimal choice made in any period is a function of the state space in that period. One class of auxiliary models used consists of parametric approximations to these decision rules. The auxiliary models imply 435 score functions which are used to identify 67 structural parameters. 34 The structural parameters being estimated include the parameters of the utility function, job offer probabilities, wage offers, unobserved type probabilities as well as the covariance matrix of the unobserved utility from each choice and the variance of the wage unobservable. 35
Simulating Data for Estimation
I perform path simulations as follows. At a given set of structural parameters, having solved the optimization problem conditional on those parameters, I simulate one-step-ahead decisions. That is,
given the state variables of a woman in a given period, I simulate her decisions by drawing a vector of the disturbances and choosing the alternative with the highest value function. The permanent unobserved heterogeneity is incorporated as follows. The probability that a simulated individual is of a given type depends on her initial state variables. Given that probability, each simulated observation is assigned a particular type by drawing randomly from the type probability function.
The score functions from the auxiliary models are then evaluated using the simulated decisions and the criterion function is calculated. 36 I iterate on the parameters using the Nelder-Mead simplex method until the criterion function is minimized.
Results

Parameter Estimates
Parameter estimates and standard errors are provided in Table 3 . The model allows for two types of women who differ in their utility from leisure and wage offer intercept. The estimated distribution of types is 50.5 percent type 1 and 49.5 percent type 2. A number of estimates are worth highlighting and make clear the static and dynamic labor market tradeoffs faced by caregivers. First, the estimates suggest initiating care provision is costly regardless of the mother's health. In addition, direct utility from providing care is greater (or less negative) when mothers are not healthy, and in particular when they have ADL needs or a memory or cognition problem. 37 Thus, those who 34 Estimates of the auxiliary parameters are not reported but are available upon request. 35 As mentioned before, the parameters of the health transition probabilities are estimated outside the structural model (i.e. outside the estimation algorithm).
36 For the purpose of calculating the score function, I perform 60 simulations for each sample observation and average that observation's score functions over the simulations.
37 The model was also estimated with nursing home utilization to see if nursing home use of mothers who cannot be left alone was generating the observed ordering of caregiving utilities (for example, α3 > α4). Nursing home use was modeled as follows. Nursing home utilization occurred with some probability which depended on the mother's realized health state and last period's nursing home use. A (dis)utility parameter from caregiving while the mother is in a nursing home was introduced and estimated. The remaining caregiving utility parameter estimates were nearly start caregiving are likely to continue to do so, especially if their mother is no longer healthy, since they have already incurred the initiation cost. As a result, the model generates persistence in caregiving, an important dynamic channel. A woman considers that if she provides care today, she will likely to do so again next period, and she will make a work decision today which accounts for this persistence in caregiving and the long-term tradeoffs it generates.
The estimates of the job offer probabilities underscore the importance of the labor market frictions. The probability of receiving a part-time job offer given a woman did not work in the previous period ranges from 7 to 13 percent, and the probability of receiving a full-time job offer given a woman did not work in the previous period ranges from 1 to 12 percent. 38 Thus, women who do not work are unlikely to receive offers the following period, making it difficult to return to work. The probability of receiving a part-time job offer given a woman worked full-time last period ranges from 27 to 41 percent. This probability is larger for women who have reached the age of 62, which captures the observed fact that many women transition from full to part-time work before retirement. The probability of receiving a full-time job offer when a woman worked part-time in the previous period ranges from 6 to 52 percent, and is larger for women who are younger than 62. These job offer probability estimates highlight important dynamic tradeoffs for caregivers. Those who leave work to provide care face low probabilities of receiving future offers, particularly full-time offers when over the age of 62, potentially leading to withdrawal from the labor force earlier than desired or expected. In addition, if a woman wishes to move from full to part-time work while providing care, such an option is not always available, and she may have to choose between combining full-time work with care responsibilities or not working. If she does work part-time while caregiving, she is not guaranteed to be able to move to full-time work in the future, but is more likely to do so if she is younger.
The wage offer parameters are reasonable and as expected. There is a wage penalty for not working in the previous period-a woman who did not work last period can expect a 13 percent lower wage offer than an otherwise similar woman who worked last period. These estimates also make clear static and dynamic tradeoffs between caregiving and work. Women who leave work to provide care forgo experience and the associated wage returns, and also face a lower expected wage if they return to work. The estimates suggest that part-time jobs are associated with lower wage offers (β 7 = −0.253), which is important since both light and intensive caregivers are more likely to work part-time than non-caregivers. In addition, if a woman is considering decreasing her work hours while caregiving she must consider first that such an option may not be available (i.e.
she may not receive a part-time offer) and second that the decrease in hours will lead to a lower expected wage.
identical to those presented here without nursing home use incorporated. Results from estimation of the model with nursing home use are available upon request.
38 The 1 percent probability of receiving a full-time offer corresponds to women who have reached the age of 62. Thus, the model can implicitly generate retirement without modeling an explicit retirement choice.
Model Fit
The parameter estimates are used to create a simulated sample consisting of 15 replicas of each sample individual's initial state space variables. The model should fit well the proportion of individuals working full-time, part-time or not all, the proportion of individuals lightly and intensively caregiving and the proportion of combined caregiving and work choices. Table 4 reports actual and simulated statistics of the proportion of women working full-time, part-time or not at all by their caregiving status, conditional on the woman's mother being alive. The model predictions match the observed fact that light and intensive caregivers are more likely to be in part-time work than non-caregivers, and that intensive caregivers are less likely to be in full-time work than both nonand light caregivers. Table 5 reports the actual and simulated proportions of combined caregiving and work choices, conditional on the woman's mother being alive. Generally, the model fits these choice proportions well, but slightly overstates the proportion of women not working, regardless of caregiving choice. Table 6 compares actual and simulated statistics for the proportion of women lightly and intensively caregiving by the mother's health status. The model fits very well along these dimensions. In particular, it is able to match the fact that intensive caregiving is more frequent for mothers who are non-healthy, and that caregiving is most prevalent when a mother has ADL needs or a memory or cognition problem. The model also fits accepted wages well, predicting an average accepted log wage of 2.622 compared to 2.669 in the actual data. Importantly, the model should not only fit choice proportions, but also transitions in caregiving and work status. Table 7 shows observed caregiving transitions in the actual and simulated data.
The model fits very well along these dimensions. Specifically, the model matches the fact that about two-thirds of caregivers continue caregiving (regardless of intensity) in the next period, conditional on the mother being alive next period. This prediction explicitly shows the persistence in caregiving generated by the model. The model also fits well the proportion of women with mothers alive who did not provide care in the previous period but caregive in the current period (regardless of intensity). Last, the model matches well the proportion of women who stop caregiving, due to either the death of the mother or the woman stopping care provision. Table 8 compares observed employment transitions in the actual and simulated data. The model fits these transitions well.
The model matches the fact that transitions from non-work to full or part-time work are rare, and transitions from part-time to full-time work and vice versa occur with slightly higher probability.
The Value of Elder Parent Care
The structural approach adopted in this paper allows for calculation of the value (equivalently, the cost) of elder parent care, which reflects both the static and dynamic value of caregiving. To determine the value of elder parent care I implement a counterfactual scenario in which women who would otherwise begin care provision are not allowed to do so. Specifically, the parameter estimates are used to create a simulated baseline sample consisting of 15 replicas of each sample individual's initial state space variables. The parameter estimates are then used again to create a simulated sample of 15 replicas of each sample individual, but a woman is not allowed to provide care (of either intensity) in the period in which she initiated care provision in the baseline scenario.
The removal of caregiving choices from the decision set comes as a surprise to the woman in that period, and she must make the best choice that does not involve providing care. 39 She makes this decision expecting the caregiving choices to be available in all future periods. I then calculate the lump-sum transfer needed to make a woman indifferent between her choice in the non-caregiving counterfactual and her choice in the baseline in the period in which she initiated care (i.e. the transfer needed to equalize the realized period value function in the non-caregiving counterfactual to the realized period value function in the baseline when she initiated care). 40 Figure 1 shows the distribution of transfer payments, excluding the top 90th percentile of transfers. The median transfer is $66,370 per two-year period, which is about half the cost of two years of nursing home care in a semi-private room (MetLife 2010b). The transfers vary with the mother's health in that period. The median value of initiating care is $63,501 when a mother is healthy, $75,539 when a mother has ADL needs or a memory problem and $64,929 when a mother cannot be left alone. The value of initiating care provision is larger when a mother has ADL needs or a memory problem for several reasons. First, the direct utility from both light and intensive caregiving is largest for those with mothers in this health state compared to the others. Second, mothers who have ADL needs or a memory problem remain in that health state with 43 percent probability, transition to the cannot be left alone health state with 18 percent probability, and transition to death with 26 percent probability on average. Thus, the daughter is likely to provide care next period since she will be able to again enjoy the direct utility from providing care if her mother remains in that health state and the initiation cost will have already been incurred. When a mother cannot be left alone she remains in that health state with about 42 percent probability and transitions to death with about 39 percent probability on average. As a result, the probability of providing care again next period is lower for these women. If her mother remains in the cannot be left alone health state, she derives less direct utility from the second period of caregiving than a woman whose mother has ADL needs or a memory problem. The transfers reflect these dynamic channels that operate via the caregiving initiation costs and the parental health transitions.
The transfers described above incorporate the option value of initiating care in a particular period since they are based on value function differences. If the transfers were instead based only on period utility differences, the future benefits of starting care would not be captured. I also calculate the transfer needed to equalize the realized period utility function in the non-caregiving counterfactual to the realized period utility function in the baseline when she initiated care. The median 39 Since women are surprised when they have the caregiving choices removed and the same draws for the idiosyncratic shocks and unobserved utility arguments are used in the baseline and counterfactual scenarios, all pre-caregiving outcomes are unchanged, in particular prior work decisions. 40 The transfer is necessarily positive since the woman is forced to make a choice from a constrained decision set in which the optimal choice is removed.
transfer based on utility differences is $5,759 per two-year period, about eleven times smaller than the transfer based on value function differences. These transfers are lower since they incorporate the utility cost from initiating care, but not the benefits from providing care in the future having already incurred this initiation cost. The large difference between the static and dynamic transfers highlights the importance of the forward-looking behavior in the model and the intertemporal nature of caregiving and work decisions.
Several previous studies, particularly in the gerontology literature, have also assigned a monetary value to informal care. However, these studies typically calculate this value by multiplying the average hours of care provided by the average or median wage of a home health aide (the replacement wage approach), the minimum wage or some average of the two (Ernst and Hay 1994 , Arno et al. 1999 , Chappell et al. 2004 , Feinberg et al. 2011 ). For example, Feinberg et al. (2011) estimate the economic value of informal care based on caregivers providing an average of 18.4 hours of care per week at an average value of $11.16 per hour, which amounts to an approximate value of $21,356 over two years. This value is substantially lower than the median transfer I calculate above based on value function differences. Johnson and LoSasso (2000) perform a back of the envelope calculation and find the loss in annual work hours for female caregivers in the US translates on average into about $7,800 in lost wages per year in 1994 dollars, or $22,663 over two years in 2008 constant dollars, similar to that found in Feinberg et al. (2011) . Ernst and Hay (1994) find the net cost of informal care for an Alzheimer's patient is $20,900 per year in 1991 dollars, or $66,076 over two years in 2008 dollars. This value is larger than those of the other studies since they estimate the weekly hours of informal care per week at 52.5, which is substantially higher than that found in most studies and the sample used in this paper. Their methodology based on 20 hours of care provision per week produces a value of $33,866 over two years. The structural approach employed in this paper allows for calculating a value of caregiving which incorporates the direct utility from providing care, the utility cost from initiating care, parental health transitions and the option value of providing care. These features are not reflected in the approaches used in the above-mentioned studies, and it appears calculations based on the replacement wage approach or current foregone wages substantially underestimate the value of elder parent care.
Policy Experiments
One of the goals of this paper is to use the structural estimates to analyze how various government sponsored elder care policies affect a woman's caregiving and work decisions. For each policy I simulate a dataset using 15 replicas of each sample individual's initial state space variables and compare the results to those of the baseline dataset simulated without the policy experiments. 41 I consider 3 policies: a two-year unpaid leave, a two-year paid leave (under different payment schemes) and a caregiver allowance for intensive caregivers. 42
Unpaid Leave
Currently in the US, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993 allows workers to take up to a 12-week unpaid leave to care for an ill family member and guarantees the worker will return to his/her job at the same wage. According to the US Department of Labor, only 10.6 percent of leave-takers utilized the FMLA to care for an ill parent in 2000 (Cantor et al. 2001 ) and most studies attribute this low take-up to the short duration and unpaid status of the leave time.
Motivated by the fact that an average caregiving spell lasts about four years (National Alliance for Caregiving and AARP 2009), the first policy experiment involves an unpaid work leave longer than the 12 weeks currently allowed under the FMLA. The policy experiment allows a woman to take a two-year unpaid leave from work to caregive intensively for her mother. Family work leaves of such lengths (and sometimes longer) are common in several European countries, such as Austria, Bulgaria and Germany. The policy is implemented as follows: Women who worked in the previous period (either full or part-time) have the option of caregiving intensively and not working during the current period with a guarantee that they will have a job offer (for the type of job they left) with certainty in the following period with no wage penalty for not working during the leave. 43 Thus, the leave alleviates a woman from combining work and intensive caregiving for a period, but she forgoes her labor income for that period. At the same time, the leave eliminates the uncertainty about returning to work since her job is held for her during the leave.
About 33 percent of women who are eligible take the unpaid leave, where eligible means the woman worked last period and is intensively caregiving in the current period. About 19 percent of women who intensively caregive are doing so while on leave. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 report the proportion of women providing intensive care by the mother's health status in the baseline simulation and in the unpaid leave simulation. The unpaid leave generates modest increases in intensive care provision.
There is evidence that the leave helps women to better maintain employment during and after a caregiving spell. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 10 report the employment status of women during and after intensive care provision in the baseline simulation and the unpaid leave simulation. The leave induces more work, especially full-time work, among these ever intensive caregivers compared to the baseline where women do not have the unpaid leave available. Figure 2 shows the proportion of unpaid leave-takers in full and part-time work in the years before and after they take the leave compared to the corresponding periods in the baseline when the leave is not available. Women seem to take the unpaid leave at a time in the baseline when intensive care provision induces them 42 Throughout the analysis of the policy experiments, it is important to keep in mind the partial equilibrium setup of the model. The demand side of the labor market is considered completely exogenous. Thus, I assume employers do not adjust their behavior in response to the counterfactual policies.
43 The leaves are aimed at women facing substantial caregiving burden and are not available to light caregivers.
to leave work, particularly full-time work. About 39 percent of those who take the leave left work in the equivalent period in the baseline, and there is no evidence in the baseline simulation that these women return to work. The unpaid leave, however, returns women to work and many of them continue working for several periods. There is a 49 (27) percent increase in the proportion of women in full-time (part-time) work in periods after the leave is taken compared to the corresponding periods in the baseline. Thus, it appears allowing women to take a leave to intensively caregive but removing the uncertainty about the availability of job offers after the leave encourages more full and part-time work for these women compared to when such a leave is unavailable. These results highlight the importance of labor market frictions for these caregivers.
Paid Leave
The second policy experiment is similar to the leave described above except the woman receives a lump-sum payment while on leave to intensively caregive, and the payment is linked to the health of the care recipient. Currently in the US, California and New Jersey have implemented paid family leave programs, but caregivers can only take a leave for a maximum of 6 weeks, and payment is tied to the worker's wage. Payments to caregivers are very common in Europe and Canada, 44 and payments to care recipients that are indexed to their health or level of need are also common. 45
I consider a combination of these pre-existing policies in that the payment is provided directly to the caregiver while on leave, and the payment varies with the health of her mother.
I simulate the paid leave under two payment schemes. The first pays $6,600 to women who intensively care for mothers with ADL needs or a memory or cognition problem and $13,200 to women who intensively care for mothers who cannot be left alone. These amounts are loosely based on the range of monthly payments that exist under Germany's Cash Allowance for Care extrapolated to a two-year period. The second payment system pays $18,250 to women who intensively care for mothers with ADL needs or a memory or cognition problem and $36,500 to women who intensively care for mothers who cannot be left alone. 46 These amounts are based on the recently suspended CLASS Act, which aimed to create a voluntary government insurance benefit to provide long-term care support. Benefits were to be triggered once a participant needed ADL help or comparable assistance because of cognitive impairment. The law specified the average minimum 44 For example, the Swedish Temporary Care Leave pays a caregiver 80 percent of her normal labor income for a maximum leave of 60 days. Canada's Compassionate Care Benefit pays 55 percent of a caregiver's average earnings for up to six weeks while she cares for a terminally ill family member. Ireland's Carer's Benefit pays a maximum of 205 euros per week for up to 104 weeks to caregivers who leave work to "care for a person in need of full-time care and attention."
45 For example, Austria's Cash Allowance for Care, Germany's Cash Allowance for Care, Luxembourg's Cash Allowance for Care and the United Kingdom's Attendance Allowance.
46 Under both payments schemes, women who intensively care for healthy mothers can take a leave, but do not receive a payment. I make this assumption since the European and Canadian policies typically require the care recipient to have sufficient need for care.
benefit be $50 per day with benefit amounts to be scaled based on the level of impairment. 47 I take a conservative approach and provide $25 per day for two years to women caring for mothers with ADL needs or a memory problem and $50 per day for two years to women caring for mothers who cannot be left alone.
Under the first payment scheme, about 39 percent of eligible women take the paid leave, and not surprisingly even more take the leave under the second payment scheme (46 percent). Table 9 shows that the paid leaves, particularly under the second payment scheme, generate somewhat larger increases in intensive care provision than the unpaid leave. Table 10 shows that the employment effects of the paid leave on women during and after intensive care provision are nearly identical to those of the unpaid leave both qualitatively and quantitatively. Figure 3 shows the proportion of paid leave-takers under the second payment scheme in full and part-time work in the years before and after they take the leave compared to the corresponding periods in the baseline when the leave is not available. There is a 40 (26) percent increase in the proportion of women in full-time (parttime) work in periods after the paid leave is taken compared to the corresponding periods in the baseline. Again, these results are similar to those of the unpaid leave. Thus, the main differences between the unpaid leave and the paid leaves are the take-up rate and subsequently how much intensive care provision the policies induce and government expenditure on the leave payments.
Caregiver Allowance
The last policy experiment provides a payment to women who intensively caregive for their nonhealthy mothers that is not linked to their employment status and may be received indefinitely. This policy experiment can inform about the labor market effects that would have occurred if the care recipient under the CLASS Act transferred the benefit payment in full to her caregiving daughter.
The payment amounts are identical to those of the second paid leave payment scheme-$18,250 for intensively caregiving for a mother with ADL needs or a memory or cognition problem and $36,500 for intensively caregiving for a mother who cannot be left alone. As seen in Table 9 , the caregiver allowance generates the largest increase in intensive care provision among all the policies considered compared to the baseline. Two channels may be driving these results-first, the policy does not require the woman to not be working to receive the payment and second, the payment can be received indefinitely. I decompose this policy and simulate it under the leave rules, meaning a woman can receive the payment at most every other period, rather than indefinitely as long as she is providing intensive care. The decomposition shows that the large increases in care provision are due mainly to the fact that unlike the previous policies discussed, the woman does not have to leave work to caregive and receive the payment. At the same time, this policy discourages work among intensive caregivers due to the income effect of receiving this payment indefinitely. Table 10 shows that the caregiver allowance leads to a 2.5 percentage point increase in non-work among women who ever provide intensive care, which is mostly due to a reduction in full-time work.
Retirement Effects of Policies
Since a caregiver is typically in her fifties and sometimes in her early sixties, the policy experiments may have important retirement effects. Table 11 shows the employment status of women who are between the ages of 62 (the Social Security early entitlement age) and 70 who ever provided intensive care in the baseline simulation, the work leave policy simulations and the caregiver allowance simulation. Both the unpaid and paid leaves slightly increase the proportion of women 62 and over who are working part-time compared to the baseline, and lead to moderate increases in full-time work compared to the baseline. The caregiver allowance slightly decreases the percentage of women working full-time age 62 and over. Thus, it appears the work leaves reduce some early withdrawal from the labor force for women who have ever provided intensive care.
The retirement effects are stronger for the group of women who ever took a leave at some point in the simulations. Table 12 compares the employment status of women 62 and over in the baseline simulation and the policy simulations who ever took an unpaid leave or paid leave. The leaves decrease non-work by about 16 to 17 percentage points compared to the baseline, which suggests the leaves are effective in preventing early retirement for many of these leave-takers. Given that the average age of a leave-taker is 57 or 58, these results show that the one period removal of uncertainty regarding the ability of a caregiver to return to work has effects for several periods. In addition, the unpaid leave is just as effective as the paid leaves in encouraging work after age 62 for leave-takers, which is an important consideration for policy makers who may aim to protect the employment of caregivers while minimizing the government expenditure needed to do so.
Welfare Comparison of Policies
Using the structure of the model, I determine the value of the various policy experiments for those who take up the policy. I calculate the lump-sum transfer needed to equalize the woman's realized period value function in the baseline (without any policies available) to her realized value function in the policy experiment scenario in the period in which she takes up the policy being analyzed. 48 Table 13 shows the median value of each policy experiment for all women who take up each particular policy, for the subset of women who take up the policy and were already intensively caregiving in the equivalent period in the baseline and for women who were induced to provide intensive care by the policy. About 50 to 60 percent of the median value of the paid leave under the larger payment scheme can be achieved with the unpaid leave, which suggests much of the benefit of the paid leaves comes from the guarantee that the woman can return to work. In addition, 48 The transfer is calculated for the period in which a woman takes a leave for the unpaid and paid leave experiments and during periods of intensive care provision for an unhealthy mother for the caregiver allowance experiment.
the unpaid leave generates comparable welfare gains to the caregiver allowance policy which does not require a woman to leave work to receive the payment. These results further emphasize the importance of the labor market frictions for caregivers and the benefit of eliminating the uncertainty regarding the availability of full and part-time jobs.
Interesting patterns emerge when comparing the welfare gains for the subgroup of women who are induced to intensively caregive by each policy. Those induced to intensively caregive by the paid leave under the smaller payment scheme excluding those caregiving for healthy mothers enjoy about $10,000 more in welfare than those induced to intensively caregive by the unpaid leave, which lies between the $6,600 and $13,200 leave payments. Those induced to intensively caregive by the paid leave under the larger payment scheme excluding those caregiving for healthy mothers enjoy about $9,000 more in welfare than those induced to intensively caregive by the paid leave with the smaller payments, which is less than the $11,650 and $23,300 increase in leave payments. This can be explained in part by the differential take-up of the leaves. As the payments increase across the leaves, more women take them and are induced to intensively caregive. These marginal leave-takers necessarily value the leaves less than women who take all three leaves. The median value of the caregiver allowance for women induced to intensively caregive by this policy is only slightly larger than the $18,250 payment and well below the $36,500 payment for those with mothers who cannot be left alone. This value is also below the median value of the unpaid leave for those induced to intensively caregive by that policy. These results have important implications for policy makers who may be concerned with balancing government expenditure with the welfare gains generated by the policies, particularly for women induced to intensively care by the policies.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have developed and estimated a dynamic discrete choice model of caregiving and work to study how elder parent care affects a woman's labor force participation and wages over the short and long-term. In contrast to the previous literature, I model caregiving and work decisions in an explicitly intertemporal framework. Women make forward-looking decisions in a model which incorporates several dynamic elements such as parental health changes, human capital accumulation and labor market frictions. I explicitly model the uncertainty women face about their parent's health and the availability of full and part-time jobs.
The model is estimated using data from the Health and Retirement Study by efficient method of moments. Based on the estimates, the model was shown to reasonably fit many aspects of the data. The estimates highlight various static and dynamic labor market tradeoffs faced by caregivers.
Women who begin care provision are likely to continue to do so, especially if their parent is in poor health. In addition, women are more likely to provide intensive care when their parent is no longer healthy, and intensive caregivers are less likely to be working. The estimates also underscore the importance of labor market frictions. Women who do not work face low probabilities of receiving job offers in the future. As a result, if a woman leaves work while caregiving she may find it difficult to return. If she works part-time while caregiving, she is not guaranteed to be able to increase her hours in the future. The wage offer estimates show women who leave work forgo experience and the associated wage returns, and also face a lower expected wage if they return to work. In addition, part-time work is associated with lower wage offers, and caregivers are more likely to be in part-time work than non-caregivers.
The model structure and estimates were used to calculate the value of elder parent care. The median value of initiating care was found to be $66,370 over two-years, about half the cost of two years of nursing home care, but two to three times larger than the values found in the previous literature. These previous values were calculated using the replacement wage approach or current foregone wages from providing care, and do not reflect the dynamic value of initiating care provision.
Thus, calculations that ignore forward-looking behavior and the intertemporal nature of caregiving and work underestimate the value of elder parent care.
The estimates were used to analyze three counterfactual policy experiments: a two-year unpaid work leave, a two-year paid work leave and a caregiver allowance for intensive caregivers. The leaves generate modest increases in intensive caregiving and substantial decreases in non-work among women during and after intensive care provision, further highlighting the importance of the labor market frictions. There is also evidence that the leaves reduce early withdrawal from the labor force. The caregiver allowance on the other hand generates substantial increases in intensive care provision but seems to discourage work among those who ever intensively caregive. A comparison of the welfare gains generated by the policies shows that about half the value of the paid leave can be achieved with the unpaid leave, and the caregiver allowance generates gains comparable to the unpaid leave. The welfare gains generated by the unpaid leave alone emphasize the benefit of guaranteeing a caregiver can return to work. The policy experiments illustrate the existence of potential important tradeoffs faced by policy makers if they wish to both protect the employment of caregivers and encourage informal care provision, as well as balance government expenditure with the welfare gains generated by the policies. spouse or widow benefits, income from unemployment or worker's compensation, income from other government transfers and her spouse's labor earnings if she is married. Non-labor income depends on whether the woman is over the age of 62 since she can begin claiming Social Security retirement benefits at that age. The interaction term between marital status and achieving the Social Security early entitlement age is meant to capture the drop in her spouse's labor earnings once he retires as well as his potential receipt of Social Security benefits.
Every period in the model, the woman receives non-labor income based on her characteristics as generated by the following equation: ln(y t ) =γ 0 + γ 1 I(educ t = 2) + γ 2 I(educ t = 3) + γ 3 I(mar t = 1) + γ 4 I(age t ≥ 62) + γ 5 I(mar t = 1)I(age t ≥ 62) + γ 6 I(age t ≥ 62)I(E t = 0) (12) Thus, I provide the daughter with the average non-labor income women with her characteristics have in the data. The estimates from the non-labor income regression are reported in Table 14 .
C Parental Health Transitions
I follow Palumbo (1999) and estimate the coefficients of the parental health transitions for three different multinomial logit models: one for each of the three health states being conditioned upon (j = healthy, ADL, alone). That is, I essentially create three different datasets and estimate a different multinomial logit specification for each. The first dataset includes the parent's health status in t + 1 and parental characteristics for all parents that were healthy at time t. The second and third datasets include parents that needed ADL help or had a memory problem and those who could not be left alone for an hour or more at time t, respectively. The multinomial logit coefficients are estimated relative to being healthy in t + 1 since γ j,healthy is normalized to zero for j = {healthy, ADL, alone} as seen in equation 6. The parameters and standard errors from the multinomial logit estimation are reported in Table 15 . The average predicted health transition matrix is given below. 
D Unobserved Type Probability Function
where µ Ω =µ 0 + µ 1 I(E −1 = P T ) + µ 2 I(E −1 = F T ) + µ 3 I(mar 0 = 1) + µ 4 age 0 + µ 5 ln w 0 + µ 6 I(w 0 = 0) + µ 7 I(asset 0 = 2) + µ 8 I(asset 0 = 3)
where E −1 is the work choice of the woman preceding the period in which she enters the sample (period t = 0). Recall that I do not use the 1992 survey wave data in the estimation, but the work choice of a woman observed in 1992 serves as her previous period's employment choice when she enters the estimation sample. If the woman enters the model with no wage (either because she did not work or the wage was not reported), she is assigned the average log wage observed in the data, and an indicator variable denotes that she entered without a wage. The woman's initial liquid assets are discretized into terciles. Coefficients for type 1 are all normalized to zero. This matrix governs the unobserved utility from each joint caregiving and work choice when women have a mother alive: where the unobserved utility v E are assumed to be distributed multivariate normal with mean zero and covariance-variance matrix estimated above. The variance of the unobserved utility from not working has been normalized to one. The relative frequency of each cell within its row is reported.
Tables and Figures
(A): Actual (S): Simulated Employment status shown for women in periods during and after intensive care provision. a Includes those on leave caring for a healthy parent, but not receiving a payment.
b Excludes those on leave caring for a healthy parent.
Always caregivers are those who were intensively caregiving in the equivalent period in the baseline.
Induced caregivers are those who were not intensively caregiving in the equivalent period in the baseline. 
